Refundable Deposits: How to Restore Cooperation in Finitely Repeated Games

[2608.27536] Refundable Deposits: How to Restore Cooperation in Finitely Repeated Games Skip to main content Search Submit Donate Log in Computer Science > Computer Science and Game Theory arXiv:2608.27536 (cs) [Submitted on 27 Aug 2026] Title: Refundable Deposits: How to Restore Cooperation in Finitely Repeated Games Authors: Giulio Salizzoni , Domenico Mergoni Cecchelli , Edward Plumb , Maryam Kamgarpour , Galit Ashkenazi-Golan View PDF HTML (experimental) Abstract: While infinitely repeated games admit a rich set of Nash equilibria, finitely repeated games typically have a much smaller and often inefficient one. We show how to enlarge this set using deposits: in each period a player may place a refundable sum with a neutral intermediary, returned when the game ends and forfeited following a deviation. Paying these deposits is voluntary and incentive compatible at every stage, so no commitment by the players is assumed, the only commitment required being that of the intermediary to a refund rule fixed before play begins. The mechanism sustains payoff profiles more efficient than those of the standard equilibria, without altering the underlying game and without transfers between players. We demonstrate it on the prisoner's dilemma, a congestion game, and a public goods game, all settings where cooperation cannot emerge in the standard finitely repeated version. We also apply it to a dynamic common-pool resource, suggesting that the construction extends beyond repeated stage-games. Subjects: Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) ; Theoretical Economics (econ.TH) Cite as: arXiv:2608.27536 [cs.GT] (or arXiv:2608.27536v1 [cs.GT] for this version) https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2608.27536 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite Submission history From: Domenico Mergoni Cecchelli [ view email ] [v1] Thu, 27 Aug 2026 15:53:14 UTC (419 KB) Full-text links: Access Paper: View PDF HTML (experimental) TeX Source view license Additional Features Audio Summary Current browse context: cs.GT < prev | next > new | recent | 2026-08 Change to browse by: cs econ econ.TH References & Citations SciX Google Scholar Semantic Scholar export BibTeX citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer ( What is the Explorer? ) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers ( What is Connected Papers? ) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps ( What is Litmaps? ) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations ( What are Smart Citations? ) Code, Data, Media Code, Data and Media Associated with this Article alphaXiv Toggle alphaXiv ( What is alphaXiv? ) Links to Code Toggle CatalyzeX Code Finder for Papers ( What is CatalyzeX? ) DagsHub Toggle DagsHub ( What is DagsHub? ) GotitPub Toggle Gotit.pub ( What is GotitPub? ) Huggingface Toggle Hugging Face ( What is Huggingface? ) ScienceCast Toggle ScienceCast ( What is ScienceCast? ) Demos Demos Replicate Toggle Replicate ( What is Replicate? ) Spaces Toggle Hugging Face Spaces ( What is Spaces? ) Spaces Toggle TXYZ.AI ( What is TXYZ.AI? ) Related Papers Recommenders and Search Tools Link to Influence Flower Influence Flower ( What are Influence Flowers? ) Core recommender toggle CORE Recommender ( What is CORE? ) Author Venue Institution Topic About arXivLabs arXivLabs: experimental projects with community collaborators arXivLabs is a framework that allows collaborators to develop and share new arXiv features directly on our website. Both individuals and organizations that work with arXivLabs have embraced and accepted our values of openness, community, excellence, and user data privacy. arXiv is committed to these values and only works with partners that adhere to them. Have an idea for a project that will add value for arXiv's community? Learn more about arXivLabs . Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax ( What is MathJax? ) We gratefully acknowledge support from our major funders , member institutions , and all contributors. About · Help · Contact · Subscribe · Copyright · Privacy · Accessibility · Operational Status (opens in new tab)

Related documents

• Refundable Deposits: How to Restore Cooperation in Finitely Repeated Games#779471
• Game Theory#702308
• Equilibrium Play Without Mutual Knowledge of Rationality#1144849
• Reframing the Prisoner's Dilemma: A Comparative Analysis of Classical Game Theory and Universal Laws of Cooperation#726123
• Stable Allocations, Unstable Payment Paths: The Shapley Value and Voluntary Coalition Formation#1034240