arXiv (All)
open access
Finding Representative and Approximately Efficient Committees
In approval-based committee voting, proportional approval voting (PAV) is a well-studied rule that combines proportional representation with Pareto efficiency. However, computing a PAV committee is NP-hard, raising a natural question: Can the proportionality and efficiency properties of PAV be achie
Conceptio Open Archive
Analyze & explore related research in Conceptio
Connect this record directly into your research workflow or AI agent. Explore citations across open repositories, query full text, and export structured proof bundles.
This document is indexed with metadata only: full text is not available in the archive for this record. Open the official source ↗
Related documents
- Improved Impossibility Bounds for Maximin Share Allocations#1084972
- Envy-Free Decompositions of Random Assignments: Settling Four Agents, and What Lies Beyond#1129789
- Unanimity Without Persuasion: A Single Round of Debate Erases the Disagreement That Verification Needs#1062047
- How Well Can Strategyproof Tournament Rules Resist Pairwise Manipulation?#975126
- The Impossibility of Strategyproof Rank Aggregation#1116205
Record · ID 984468
Retrieved via Conceptio: every document is proof-bundled with source, license, and retrieval metadata.
Retrieved via Conceptio: every document is proof-bundled with source, license, and retrieval metadata.
Bring this data into your agent: Connect via MCP or API · 20 free credits to start · no card required
Read the Docs → · View CLI source on GitHub · Conceptio Open Knowledge Archive
Read the Docs → · View CLI source on GitHub · Conceptio Open Knowledge Archive